

# **Preparing For Peacekeeping Operations Through Battle Focused Training**

**A Monograph  
by  
Major David J. Bongi  
Infantry**




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## ABSTRACT

PREPARING FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS THROUGH BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING by MAJ David J. Bongio, USA, 56 pages.

This monograph presents a theoretical study which identifies peacekeeping training requirements for a light infantry force at the platoon and squad level. Two important assumptions made in this study are: (1) the Army will continue to train for war--to fight and win in combat--as its primary mission; and (2) the Army will train for war using the Battle Focused Training concept. With the rise in peacekeeping missions, this study focuses on identifying peacekeeping training requirements using the Battle Focused Training concept.

This monograph presents an analysis into the nature of peacekeeping operations, and current Joint, Army, and International doctrine on peacekeeping in order to develop a theoretical mission statement for a peacekeeping force. Further analysis of this mission statement and current guidance deduces a peacekeeping Mission Essential Task List (METL) from which supporting collective tasks are identified.

This monograph concludes that: (1) Battle Focused training can prepare a light infantry organization for the majority of military-type tasks necessary to execute a peacekeeping force operation without detracting significantly from their warfighting focus. In this study, seventy percent of the supporting collective tasks to the peacekeeping METL were warfighting collective tasks; (2) there are certain military and non-military related tasks or peacekeeping-specific tasks--identified in the monograph-- that require additional training time prior to employment in a peacekeeping operation; (3) there are certain "high-payoff" tasks (tasks which are both peacekeeping and warfighting) which can help focus training strategies; and (4) in order to execute METL and supporting tasks identified in this study, peacekeepers must re-orient their attitudes toward impartiality and non-coercion.


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
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
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## I Introduction

What happened to the peace, harmony, and tranquillity that was supposed to follow the demise of the bi-polar world? The end of the Cold War has failed to produce what many thought would be a more peaceful world order. Instead, regional conflicts involving ethnic, religious, and nationalist motives are tearing at the fabric of the world security structure. Furthermore, while possessing many of the characteristics of war, these regional conflicts are not war in the classic sense. This phenomenon has presented political and military strategists with a labyrinth of amorphous conditions which threaten to further weaken an already fragile world security environment.

The problem the U.S. Army faces is one of comprehension. Simply put, these "conflicts" do not fit our traditional understanding of war. Since time immemorial, the Army's understanding of the nature of war, has guided its training program. In the tradition of great military theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini, the Army has trained to close with to destroy or defeat the enemy, by employing overwhelming combat power at the right time and place.<sup>1</sup>

Arguably, we are experiencing a paradigm shift. The large conventional war scenario typified by the Cold War era, which has driven everything from our force structure to training, is giving way to an era of limited operations which may or may not involve combat. Moreover, as the rules of the

international security game are changing, so is the doctrine of the U.S. Army. Reflecting innovative thought in a new strategic era, the Army's lexicon now includes, "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW) in the latest version (June 1993) of FM 100-5, Operations.<sup>2</sup>

FM 100-5 identifies three "states of the environment": war, conflict, and peace. War "involves the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy."<sup>3</sup> An environment of conflict is any activity just short of war. Conflict is "characterized by hostilities to secure strategic objectives" and includes operations such as strikes and raids, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, antiterrorism, and non combatant evacuation operations (NEO).<sup>4</sup> The last environment is peace. Peace is characterized by those activities that are employed by a nation to influence world events. They include counterdrug, disaster relief, civil support, and nation building. Operations other than war are classified as those activities occurring during conflict and peacetime.

A question that comes to the forefront is: can an army that trains for war immediately transition to operations other than war? This is a difficult question to answer since the differences between the two are truly differences in kind, not degree. But such a comprehensive question is beyond the parameters of this study; therefore, this study narrows the scope in two ways: mission and organization. The mission is peacekeeping (see section "Key Terms" for peacekeeping



definition). Peacekeeping operations are increasing throughout the world. Currently, there are over 55,000 peacekeepers from 69 nations involved in peacekeeping operations and these numbers are expected to rise.<sup>5</sup> The organization is a light infantry battalion.<sup>6</sup> This organization was selected for two reasons: (1) as an analytical tool; (2) it is normally best suited to perform peacekeeping missions.<sup>7</sup>

Notwithstanding the rise in peacekeeping missions, the Army continues to train, as it should, for war. The Army's Battle Focused Training concept, as espoused in FM 25-100, Training the Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, constitutes the Army's training concept which prepares units for war. The first sentence of FM 25-100 states: "Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win in combat--the Army's basic mission."<sup>8</sup> But as already stated, OOTW, such as peacekeeping, may not involve the use of force. A peacekeeping mission establishes a distinct set of operating parameters that are within the scope of military operations, but are obviously something other than what the Army primarily trains.

Undoubtedly, there is a dialectic between traditional training for war and training requirements for an environment such as peacekeeping. Opinions vary among military professionals concerning the viability of training units for two diametrically opposite roles--warmaking and peacekeeping.<sup>9</sup> At either end of the continuum exists two different approaches

to force training: (1) a unit should train only for war; if it is proficient at its warfighting skills, then it can succeed in other operations such as peacekeeping; and (2) peacekeeping is a unique mission that requires different tasks and skills; therefore, a unit must conduct training specifically for peacekeeping.

A purely logical approach to this dilemma would indicate that indeed some unique skills are required for peacekeeping. As previously mentioned, the U.S. Army trains to use overwhelming combat power at a decisive point; whereas, a peacekeeper's success depends on *preventing* conflict through means *other than the employment of combat power*. "The 'weapons' used by peacekeepers in achieving his objectives are those of negotiation, mediation, quiet diplomacy, tact, and patience of Job. . . ."10 In essence, we teach a soldier "how not to fight."

From what has been presented so far, we can make two assumptions. First, the Army will continue to train for war--to fight and win in combat--as its primary mission. Second, the Army will do this through the Battle Focused Training concept. Therefore, the question for this monograph is: to what degree does the Battle Focused Training concept identify the training requirements for a peacekeeping force?11

The identification of these training requirements is important to the effective use of training time. By identifying the training requirements, we can develop an

effective training strategy which focuses on warfighting, but integrates, where possible, peacekeeping-oriented training. This makes the most effective use of our training time and is especially important today since the effective use of time is linked with the declining force structure and budget.

The Army continues to downsize while it simultaneously takes on new commitments.<sup>12</sup> The shrinking force structure has reduced the pool of available forces to fulfill these commitments. This means units which were previously not likely to become involved in a peacekeeping operation are now susceptible. Moreover, the reduction in the Army's operating budget means potentially less training time. In short, we must not only do more with less, but we may also have a shorter period of time in which to prepare. This phenomenon demands innovative training concepts that prepare units for a greater range of employment options while still adhering to the Army's fundamental training philosophy of preparing for war.

#### Methodology

This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter I is the Introduction. Chapter II is: Peacekeeping Mission Essential Tasks. This chapter focuses on developing a mission essential task list for peacekeeping. A theoretical analysis into the nature of peacekeeping is conducted in order to deduce a working mission statement for peacekeeping forces.<sup>13</sup> It then applies the Battle Focused Training concept to

theoretical peacekeeping requirements in order to develop a peacekeeping mission essential task list (METL). The analysis in this chapter is guided by the following questions: What is the mission of the peacekeeper? How does he accomplish this mission? What are the mission essential tasks which support this mission? What is the nature of these tasks? Chapter III is: Supporting Collective Tasks. This chapter identifies both warfighting and peacekeeping collective tasks. The analysis is guided by the following questions: What are the peacekeeping collective tasks? What warfighting collective tasks support peacekeeping? Which tasks support both peacekeeping and warfighting? Chapter IV is: Conclusions. This chapter synthesizes the foregoing analysis to determine the degree of effectiveness of Battle Focused training in identifying peacekeeping requirements.

#### Key terms

Although this study is about peacekeeping, it is important to understand the differences between the various terminology. The three most commonly used terms are: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace making. Additionally, the terms passive and active force are defined as well as warfighting and peacekeeping collective task.

Peacekeeping: "Operations, conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions that support the diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict."<sup>14</sup>

Peacekeepers help maintain a negotiated truce by deterring violence.<sup>15</sup> Peacekeepers use patrols--both air and ground--and observation posts to monitor the situation. While taking an active role in maintaining peace, peacekeepers must be perceived as an impartial force by the disputing parties. The Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO) deployed in the Sinai is an example of peacekeeping.

Peace Enforcement: "Military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activities."<sup>16</sup> The fundamental difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations is the consent to the peacekeeping mission by the belligerents. Furthermore, peace enforcers are more likely to employ combat power than peacekeeping forces. UN peace enforcement operations have been used twice: Korea and Kuwait.<sup>17</sup>

Peace Making: Peace making is the "process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement."<sup>18</sup> An example of peacemaking is the treaty signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in September 1993.

Throughout this study reference is made to the "use of force" during peacekeeping missions. It is necessary to distinguish between the two different types of force: active and passive.

Passive Force: The use of passive force "is the employment of physical means which will normally not result in the physical harm to individuals, installations, and equipment."<sup>19</sup>

Active force: The use of active force "is the employment and use of means that may result in the physical harm to individuals, installations, and equipment."<sup>20</sup>

Collective Task: "A unit of work or action requiring interaction between two or more individuals for its accomplishment."<sup>21</sup> *Warfighting collective tasks* are those tasks identified in the ARTEP 7-8 MTP for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, which support the seven critical wartime operations. *Peacekeeping collective tasks* are those tasks identified in several doctrinal publications and listed in this study.<sup>22</sup>


## II Peacekeeping Mission Essential Tasks

This chapter develops a mission essential task list (METL) for a peacekeeping force. The methodology used is that of the Army's Battle Focused Training concept.

### Peacekeeping Mission

Developing a peacekeeping METL--like a warfighting METL--requires the identification of the unit's mission.<sup>23</sup> With a peacekeeping mission, we can then develop a peacekeeping METL. FM 25-100, describes the METL development process and is shown in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1  
METL Development



War plans are a unit's wartime operations and contingency plans while external directives are additional sources of training tasks that relate to a unit's wartime mission. The commander analyzes the tasks contained in the external directives and commander then selects those tasks for training which are essential to the accomplishment of the unit's wartime mission.<sup>24</sup> These tasks constitute the unit's METL.


Unlike the development of a wartime METL, we do not have "war plans" for the development of our peacekeeping METL. This fact, plus the complexity and diversity of the 27 major UN peacekeeping operations indicates that a historical review and analysis is neither practical nor feasible within the scope of this monograph; therefore, we will use a theoretical approach.

The development process generally follows the same framework for warfighting METL development but with some augmentation. First, war plans and external guidance are combined into one process called "guidance." This guidance comes from various sources: doctrinal publications (Joint, Army, and United Nations) and Standard Operating Procedures for the Multinational Force and Observers. These documents provide us--in much the same way war plans and external directives do--the necessary guidance needed to develop a peacekeeping mission.

The second part of the first step is a theoretical investigation into the nature of peacekeeping operations in order to identify its theoretical truths. Applying these theoretical truths to a logical analysis will help us to develop a peacekeeping mission statement.<sup>25</sup> Doctrinal publications on peacekeeping do not offer a peacekeeping mission in specific enough terms for our purposes. There is much discussion about broad tasks and skills, but they are not linked to what would be considered a mission statement. Therefore, we will develop one in order to create a peacekeeping METL. From the mission statement and the sources of guidance, we can deduce our peacekeeping METL and supporting collective tasks (hence, the dotted line connecting guidance and peacekeeping collective tasks). Figure 2 below shows the process.



Figure 2  
Peacekeeping METL Development Process



First, In order to develop a working mission statement using our "theoretical investigation" we must turn to our "guidance" in order to identify the different types of peacekeeping missions. Joint Pub (Test) 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, September 1990 and Joint Pub (Revised Final Draft) 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Peacekeeping Operations, August 1992, recognize three broad missions for US peacekeeping forces: peacekeeping support, observer missions, and peacekeeping forces.<sup>26</sup>

A peacekeeping support mission refers to primarily logistical and financial support for peacekeeping operations.<sup>27</sup>

Logistical support is normally in the form of equipment and supplies. As an example, the US provides a large percentage of logistical support to the entire international force for the MFO operations in the Sinai.<sup>28</sup>

Observer missions refer to individuals acting as either observers or functional area experts under the command of the UN or some other organization. Whether operating in small groups or a large contingent, the mission of observers is normally limited to observe, record, and report implementation of a truce and any violation thereof.<sup>29</sup> Examples of observer missions include: the MFO in the Sinai, the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Lebanon (UNTSO), the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), and the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG).

A peacekeeping force can be a combat, combat support, or combat service support unit in support of a peacekeeping operation. The mission of a peacekeeping force transcends mere observation and reporting to active involvement (normally thorough interposition) in helping to restore and maintain peace. A peacekeeping force will normally contain a headquarters element, combat units, and support units. U.S. combat units are normally light infantry-type organizations and combat support units can include medical, communications, and an air support element.<sup>30</sup> Examples of peacekeeping forces are: the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) from 1973-1979 in the Sinai, and

the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This study's focus is on the mission of peacekeeping forces.

Second, in order to help identify the peacekeepers' mission, we must analyze the purpose or object of a peacekeeping force as well as the essential characteristics of a peacekeeping force. Joint Pub 3-07.3 states that the purpose of a peacekeeping force is to "promote the conditions that support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace."<sup>31</sup>

We know that peace is the "freedom from war or civil strife."<sup>32</sup> The first question we must ask is: what are the conditions which support peace? Generally, we can say that these conditions are things such as equanimity, agreement, security, stability, and so on. In other words, the conditions which do not promote war or civil strife. Since the probability is low that an atmosphere of harmony and tranquillity exists in a country where a peacekeeping operation is being employed or at least being considered, we must therefore examine the antithesis. That is to say: what conditions would prevent or at least do not support peace? This is an important distinction since conditions that promote peace must be nurtured and further developed; whereas, the conditions that prevent or do not support peace must be eliminated or at least contained. The latter must be dealt with first, before the former can be promoted.

Obviously, there are many adverse conditions that could prevent the promotion of peace: instability, hostile acts, disagreement, fighting, and so on. However, for simplicity's sake, we can synthesize these into one general term--hostilities. If some hostilities still remain, the probability to create conditions auspicious to peace are extremely low.<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, peacekeepers may be required to "promote the conditions that support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace"<sup>34</sup> in basically one of two environments: one in which some fighting remains, or one in which fighting has ended.

If, in theory, conditions which do not support peace must be dealt with first, then the question remaining is: how does a peacekeeping force do this?

In an environment where some hostilities exist, a peacekeeping force must accomplish one of two things in order to achieve their object:

- A. Stop hostilities, or
- B. If unable to stop it, as a minimum contain hostilities.

Unless this goal is achieved, no other efforts towards peace can begin in earnest.

But what if the fighting has ended? In an environment where hostilities have ended by a peacemaking or some other effort, then a peacekeeping force may be required to supervise

the implementation of the political terms agreed upon by the belligerents during such an effort.

Next, we turn to the essential characteristics of a peacekeeping force. They can be narrowed down to basically two:

- A. Impartiality<sup>35</sup>
- B. Commitment to the minimum use of force.<sup>36</sup>

Adding these essential characteristics to our analytical framework is essential, for while a peacekeeping force may be required to stop or contain hostilities, they must do so while maintaining impartiality and by using the minimum use of force. This limitation has great influence on how peacekeepers accomplish their mission. In fact, it goes beyond influence; it determines their methods.

Finally, from the above analysis, we can identify a working mission statement for the purpose of this study: The mission statement is:

**A designated unit conducts a peacekeeping operation as a peacekeeping force to stop or contain potential hostilities and/or supervises the implementation of the negotiated settlement between the belligerents in order to establish favorable conditions that support diplomatic efforts to promote a long-term peace.**

### Peacekeeping Tasks

Peacekeeping operations can vary significantly. Each peacekeeping force has its own mission-specific set of tasks based on political, cultural, religious, economic, and ethnic factors. Furthermore, the nature of the conflict that required the peacekeeping effort will also delineate a set of unique tasks. The difference in tasks can vary from common military functions such as security and patrolling, to tasks not normally associated with military activities such as restoration of a sovereign government.

The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created under a mandate (Resolution 186) on 4 March, 1964. This mandate required the force to prevent a recurrence of the fighting between the Turkish and Greek communities; and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order.<sup>37</sup> Both tasks are closely related to military functions. On the other hand, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was tasked to confirm a cease fire and immediate withdrawal from Lebanese territory; to restore international peace and security; and to ensure the restoration of Lebanese governmental authority and its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and territorial independence.<sup>38</sup> For the latter, it was a relatively more diverse and complex set of tasks.

Clearly, the uniqueness of peacekeeping operations will include mission-specific tasks that can only be

identified once the mission is received. However, several doctrinal publications have codified broad peacekeeping tasks. Army and Joint doctrine, as espoused in FM 7-98 and FM 100-20, and Joint Pubs 3-07.3, and 3-07 and the UN Peacekeeping Operations Training Guide have identified numerous broad tasks that may be assigned to a peacekeeping force (see Table 1 below). These tasks are useful since they have been derived from actual peacekeeping operations and provide us with a list of tasks to build the peacekeeping METL.

Table 1  
Broad Peacekeeping Collective Tasks<sup>39</sup>

FM 7-98	FM 100-20	UN Peace Keeping Tng Guide	Joint Pub 3-07	Joint Pub 3-07.3
1. Separate the opposing sides and at the same time establish a buffer zone.	1. Maintain area surveillance.	1. Separation of forces.	1. Separate the opposing sides and at the same time establish a buffer zone.	1. Supervision of free territories.
2. Supervise a truce or cease fire agreement.	2. Observe area activities.	2. Policing agreements.	2. Supervise a truce or cease fire agreement.	2. Supervision of cease fires.
3. Prevent an armed conflict between nations or within a nation.	3. Report findings.	3. Supervision of withdrawal.	3. Defusing an armed conflict between nations or within a nation	3. Supervision of withdrawals and disengagements

<b>FH 7-98</b>	<b>FH 100-20</b>	<b>UN Peace Keeping Tng Guide</b>	<b>Joint Pub 3-07</b>	<b>Joint Pub 3-07.3</b>
4. Contribute to the maintenance of law and order, and return to normal conditions.	4. Oversee rectification of violations.		4. Contribute to the maintenance of law and order, and return to normal conditions.	4. Supervision of prisoner of war exchange.
				5. Supervision of de-militarization and demobilization
				6. Maintenance of law and order.

Keeping our mission statement in mind--a designated unit conducts a peacekeeping operation as a peacekeeping force to stop or contain potential hostilities and/or supervises the implementation of the negotiated settlement between the belligerents in order to establish favorable conditions that support diplomatic efforts to promote a long-term peace--the following two questions must be answered in order to identify mission essential tasks:

A. How does a peacekeeping force that is limited to the minimum use of force stop or contain hostilities?

B. How does a peacekeeping force implement or supervise a negotiated truce?



The answers to the first question reveal the essential tasks which support part of the mission statement. The force must:

A. **Separate the belligerents.** Without a separation of the belligerents, situations are likely to occur that would re-ignite hostilities, halting any further progress towards peace.

B. **Maintain surveillance and supervision.** A basic mission of any peacekeeping force, maintaining surveillance allows the peacekeeping force to preempt, through mediation and negotiation, situations which could re-ignite fighting. Furthermore, maintaining surveillance is essential to ensuring compliance with negotiated agreements. Peacekeepers are frequently required to supervise such things as cease-fires, withdrawals or disengagements, demobilization.

C. **Conduct negotiation and mediation.** Invariably, peacekeeping forces will be required to negotiate, mediate, or perhaps arbitrate minor disputes. Although the points of contention may only be minor, if not handled correctly the consequences could have international impact that would adversely affect the overall peacekeeping effort. It is for this reason that negotiation and mediation is considered a mission essential task for all peacekeepers. While normally thought of as an individual skill executed only at senior levels, negotiations and mediations occur most often at the lowest echelons and as a team effort in peacekeeping

missions (see section in this chapter: Personal Skills for Peacekeepers). Negotiation and mediation will also be critical during implementing and supervising a negotiated truce.

The answers to the second question--how does a peacekeeping force implement or supervise a negotiated truce--complete the tasks required to support the mission statement. The force must:

**A. Maintain law and order.** Implementing or supervising a negotiated truce implies hostilities have temporarily ended. In order to ensure that the agreements are executed, peacekeeping forces must maintain law and order especially in the case where no buffer zone exists.

**B. Investigate and report violations.** Implementing or supervising a negotiated truce will require the peacekeeping force to investigate and report violations of the agreements. Without reported, documented violations, political leaders would not have the necessary political leverage to pressure belligerents into adhering to agreements. The ability to perform this task correctly can often make the difference between a resumption of fighting or a continuation of peace, hence its inclusion in the METL.

Table 2 below lists the five peacekeeping METL deduced from our theoretical investigation.

Table 2  
Peacekeeping METL

• Separate the Belligerents.
• Maintain Surveillance and Supervision
• Conduct Negotiation and Mediation.
• Maintain Law and Order.
• Investigate and Report Violations.

### III Supporting Collective Tasks

The Army's training philosophy focuses on gaining and sustaining warfighting proficiency and, as already stated, the Army does this through its Battle Focused Training concept.

The essence of the Battle Focused training is the recognition of the inherent difficulty that arises when a unit attempts to achieve and sustain proficiency on all possible tasks. Constraints in resources--time, money, space--make such a laudable goal unattainable. Therefore, we must search for the training opportunities that include high- payoff tasks in the unit training strategy. High-payoff tasks in this sense mean those warfighting collective tasks which are also considered peacekeeping tasks.

The execution of peacekeeping operations are inherently decentralized.<sup>40</sup> From manning observation posts, to conducting security patrols, to establishing and manning roadblocks and checkpoints, the execution of successful

peacekeeping operations rests at the lowest levels of the infantry battalion organization i.e., the squad and platoon levels. Therefore, our search for collective tasks that support our peacekeeping METL is at this levels.

### Supporting Collective Tasks

What collective tasks support the accomplishment of our peacekeeping METL? As mentioned earlier, there are essentially two broad kinds: peacekeeping collective tasks and warfighting collective tasks. Generally, peacekeeping tasks have been identified in several doctrinal publications (see Table 3). We must then ask: why are they peacekeeping tasks? First, they have been identified as critical to some aspect of the overall peacekeeping mission. Second, their frequency of execution by a peacekeeping force is high. Locating, identifying, and marking minefields is a good example. A peacekeeping force normally involves the interposition between warring parties.<sup>41</sup> This interposition is in the vicinity of, or perhaps directly in, a former battlefield. They may even be in an environment where some elements of the belligerents are still engaged in fighting. Separating belligerents to internationally recognized boundaries after fighting will mean the creation of a buffer zone (UNEF I and II and UNFICYP are examples of this technique).<sup>42</sup> Establishing this zone very often requires peacekeepers to clear minefields. If the minefields are a hindrance to UN operations they must be cleared to permit

freedom of movement; if not a hindrance, they must be marked and sealed-off.<sup>43</sup> This task is vital to both the overall security of the buffer zone and the freedom of movement for the peacekeeping force.

Like the broad peacekeeping tasks identified in Chapter II, we must turn to several doctrinal publications to find supporting peacekeeping tasks. Army doctrine in FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, October 1992; FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, December 1990; FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, December 1990; Joint Pubs 3-07.3, and 3-07; and the UN's Peacekeeping Operations Training Guide have identified common tasks for peacekeeping operations. These publications make no distinction between collective and individual tasks. While the focus of this study is on collective tasks, some individual tasks identified in these publications are also listed in Table 3. The reason for inclusion is that these individual skills have a direct bearing on the peacekeeping METL. For example, the task "Familiarity with Theater Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment" is clearly an individual skill, but it is also a critical skill for all peacekeepers. This task is directly linked to at least three of our five peacekeeping METL tasks: Surveillance and Supervision, Maintain Law and Order, and Investigate and Report Violations.

**Table 3**  
**Peacekeeping Tasks<sup>44</sup>**

<b>TASK</b>	<b>Joint Pub 3- 07.3</b>	<b>FM 100-20</b>	<b>FM 7-98</b>	<b>FM 7-10</b>	<b>UN Peace Keeping Guide</b>
Intelligence or Information Gathering	<b>X</b>		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
Counterintelligence	<b>X</b>				
Observing and Reporting	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>		
Patrolling	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
Locating, Identifying, and Marking Mines	<b>X</b>				<b>X</b>
Checkpoints, Road- blocks, Searches			<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
Investigation of Complaints		<b>X</b>			<b>X</b>
Negotiation and Mediation		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>		<b>X</b>
Clearing Mines		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
Marking Forward Limits of Each Sides Military Forces/Buffer Zones		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
Surveillance and Supervision		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>		
Searching for Missing Persons			<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
Providing Logistical Support for Isolated Ethnic Groups			<b>X</b>		
Receiving the Remains of KIAs		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
Field Exercises Including Battle Practice					<b>X</b>
Preventing or Dispersing Prohibited Demonstrations			<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
Familiarity with Theater Weapons, Vehicles and Equipment			<b>X</b>		<b>X</b>

TASK	Joint Pub 3- 07.3	FM 100-20	FM 7-98	FM 7-10	UN Peace Keeping Guide
Traffic Control			X	X	X
First Aid, Hygiene, and Field Sanitation			X		X
Positions and Observation Posts			X		X
Chemical, Biological, and Radiation Defense	X		X		
Use of Force/ROE			X		X

A quick review of this matrix indicates that the task "patrolling" is mentioned most often. It is the only task identified by all five sources as being a necessary task for peacekeeping forces. The reasoning is simple. Patrolling allows coverage of large areas that may otherwise go unobserved. Furthermore, it acts as a confidence builder amongst the local population that the peacekeeping force is taking an active role in the peace process. Yet, even with patrolling, it still may not provide the surveillance capability needed as was the case with the UN peacekeeping force in Yemen in the early sixties. Despite the use of aerial and ground patrols plus observation posts, the number of crossing sites along the demilitarized zone far exceeded the capability of the peacekeeping force.<sup>45</sup>

The tasks of intelligence or information gathering; observing and reporting; checkpoints, roadblocks, searches; negotiation and mediation; marking buffer zones; receiving the

remains of KIAs; and traffic control were identified in three of the sources. One of these tasks, negotiation and mediation, has already been identified as a mission essential task.

The warfighting collective tasks at the platoon and squad level are easily found in one source, the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) manual ARTEP 7-8 MTP, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, September 1988. These collective tasks support the seven critical wartime operations of the platoon:<sup>46</sup>

- A. Movement to Contact
- B. Attack
- C. Raid
- D. Ambush
- E. Reconnaissance and Security
- F. Defend
- G. Retrograde

Each of these wartime operations are composed of collective tasks, drills, and individual tasks. There are 48 collective tasks spanning all of the battlefield operating systems in support of these operations.<sup>47</sup>

Keeping our peacekeeping METL in mind, applying the criteria of crossover (is it a peacekeeping task as well) to these warfighting collective tasks and frequency (the likelihood of use in a peacekeeping mission, regardless of whether it is a warfighting or peacekeeping task), it becomes



apparent that some tasks support peacekeepers more than others. Table 4 below identifies all 48 collective tasks and shows whether or not the task is a crossover to peacekeeping tasks and the likelihood of use by a peacekeeping force.

Table 4  
Warfighting Collective Tasks<sup>48</sup>

Task	Battlefield Operating System	Crossover	Likelihood for Use
Reconnoiter Zone	Intelligence	yes	high
Reconnoiter Area	Intelligence	yes	high
Reconnoiter Route	Intelligence	yes	high
Occupy OP Perform Surveillance	Intelligence	yes	high
Breach Obstacles	Mobility and Survivability	yes	high
Perform Helicopter Movement	Mobility and Survivability	no	high
Prepare for Chemical Attack	Mobility and Survivability	yes	moderate <sup>49</sup>
Cross Chemically Contaminated Area	Mobility and Survivability	no	moderate
Prepare for Nuclear Attack	Mobility and Survivability	yes	low
Cross Nuclear Contaminated Area	Mobility and Survivability	no	low
Construct Obstacles	Mobility and Survivability	yes	high
Cross Water Obstacle	Mobility and Survivability	no	low
Perform Boat Movement	Mobility and Survivability	no	low
Maintain Operations Security	Mobility and Survivability	yes	high
Defend Against Air Attack	Air Defense	no	low
Perform Aerial Resupply	Combat Service Support	no	high

<b>Task</b>	<b>Battlefield Operating System</b>	<b>Crossover</b>	<b>Likelihood for Use</b>
<i>Perform Vehicle Operations</i>	<i>Combat Service Support</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>high</i>
<i>Sustain</i>	<i>Combat Service Support</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>high</i>
<i>Occupy Assembly Area</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>moderate</i>
<i>Move Tactically</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>high</i>
<i>Cross Danger Area</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>high</i>
<i>Perform Tactical Roadmarch</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>high</i>
<i>Perform Passage of Lines</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>moderate</i>
<i>Occupy a Patrol Base</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>high</i>
<i>Perform Linkup</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>high</i>
Assault	Maneuver	no	low
Overwatch	Maneuver	no	low
Support by Fire	Maneuver	no	low
<i>Disengage</i>	<i>Maneuver</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>moderate</i>
Knock Out Bunker	Maneuver	no	low
Clear Trench Line	Maneuver	no	low
Perform Raid	Maneuver	no	low
Perform Anti-Armor Ambush	Maneuver	no	low
Perform Hasty Ambush	Maneuver	no	low
Perform Point Ambush	Maneuver	no	low
Defend	Maneuver	no	low
Clear Wood Line	Maneuver	no	low
Occupy ORP	Maneuver	no	low
Clear a Building	Maneuver	no	low
Defend a Built-Up Area	Maneuver	no	low
Perform Stay Behind Operations	Maneuver	no	low
Perform Area Ambush	Maneuver	no	low
Infil/Exfil	Maneuver	no	low
Assault Mounted	Maneuver	no	low
Cross Defile	Maneuver	no	low
Screen	Maneuver	no	low

<b>Task</b>	<b>Battlefield Operating System</b>	<b>Crossover</b>	<b>Likelihood for Use</b>
Employ Fire Support	Fire Support	no	low
Prep for Combat Operations	C2	no	low
<i>Consolidate and Reorganise</i>	<i>C2</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>moderate</i>

Of the 48 collective tasks, seven are both directly related to peacekeeping skills and have a high likelihood of use. These seven (in bold print) comprise our high-payoff list. Additionally, there are some tasks (noted in the table in *italics*) which are not directly related to peacekeeping, but are tasks which can support our peacekeeping METL. These tasks have a high or moderate likelihood of use; there are 16 of them. For example, the task "Perform Aerial Resupply" is not a peacekeeping task per se, but peacekeepers will routinely use this method of resupply for patrols and remote observation posts.

Returning now to our peacekeeping METL, we can start to identify critical collective tasks (peacekeeping and warfighting) which support our METL.

A. METL Task: **Separate the Belligerents**. We have determined from our mission analysis that this task is the fundamental task of a peacekeeping force. Executing it requires peacekeepers to oversee the withdrawal of belligerents and to create a buffer zone. This will further necessitate the occupation of critical roads and

intersections, key terrain features, and, possibly, local settlements within the buffer zone. Peacekeepers must also mark and/or clear mines and obstacles, observe for possible cross boarder violations, and maintain a credible presence throughout the buffer zone.

Collective tasks which support this METL task are:

Conduct Patrolling; Establish Checkpoints, Roadblocks, Searches; Create and Maintain a Buffer Zone; Provide Traffic Control; Establish Observation Posts; Conduct Observation and Surveillance; Location, Identify, and Mark Mines; Preventing or Dispersing Prohibited Demonstrations; Construct Obstacles; Move Tactically, Reconnoiter Zone; Reconnoiter Area; Reconnoiter Route; Breach Obstacles; Cross Chemically Contaminated Area; Cross Danger Area; Perform Aerial Resupply; Perform Vehicle Operations; Perform passage of Lines; Consolidate and Reorganize; Sustain.

B. METL Task: **Maintain Surveillance and Supervision.** This task is essential to ensuring that the former belligerents are complying with the terms of a negotiated settlement. Peacekeepers executing this task routinely observe activities throughout the area of operation (including the buffer zone), record events, report violations and changes in the situation. Surveillance also aids in gaining information and intelligence which in turn supports negotiation and mediation. Surveillance can be conducted through several methods: foot and aerial patrols, observation

posts, and checkpoints. The distinction between the surveillance and supervision is identified in FM 7-98:

Surveillance is the conduct of observation and is used to conduct observer missions. Supervision is the act of observing the compliance to the dispute with agreement by the parties.<sup>50</sup>

Collective tasks which support this METL task are:

Establish Observation Posts; Conduct Observation and Surveillance; Intelligence or Information Gathering; Investigation of Complaints; Familiarity with Theater Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment; Reconnoiter Zone; Reconnoiter Area; Reconnoiter Route; Perform Helicopter Movement; Perform Aerial Resupply; Occupy a Patrol Base; Perform Linkup; Sustain.

C. METL Task: **Maintain Law and Order.** The primary purpose of this essential task is the need for stability. Defusing potential hostile acts by one or more belligerents allows for the continuance of conditions which promote a long-term peace. Many times such situations can be avoided through prior preparation. Warnings of likely demonstrations, hostilities, and illegal acts such as smuggling drugs or arms can assist the peacekeeping force in establishing measures which can preempt them.

Collective tasks which support this METL task are:

Patrolling; Investigation of Complaints; Establish Observation Posts; Establish Checkpoints, Roadblocks, Searches; Create and Maintain a Buffer Zone; Familiarity with Theater Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment; Employ the Proper Use of Force/ROE; Preventing or Dispersing Prohibited Demonstrations; Move

Tactically; Cross Danger Area; Perform Tactical Roadmarch;  
Perform Passage of Lines; Occupy a Patrol Base; Perform  
Linkup; Construct Obstacles; Breach Obstacles; Perform Vehicle  
Operations; Disengage; Consolidate and Reorganize; Sustain.

**D. METL Task: Investigate and Report**

**Violations.** In order to ensure belligerents are adhering to the negotiated agreements, peacekeepers must investigate complaints or allegations made by either party. The peacekeeper must be able to make an objective investigation and fair assessment.<sup>51</sup> The skills required to perform this task are discussed in the section: Personal Skills for Peacekeepers.

Collective Tasks: Investigation of Complaints;  
Familiarity with Theater Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment;  
Intelligence or Information Gathering; Occupy OP Perform  
Surveillance; Reconnoiter Zone; Reconnoiter Area; Reconnoiter  
Route.

**E. METL Task: Conduct Negotiation and**

**Mediation.** Assigning specific collective tasks in support of this METL is difficult. The skills used to negotiate and mediate are skills identified with the personal qualities of peacekeepers (see section: Personal Skills for Peacekeepers in this chapter).

Collective Tasks: Intelligence or Information  
Gathering; Investigation of Complaints.

## Personal Skills for Peacekeepers

Two of the five peacekeeping METL tasks are intrinsically linked to the personal qualities of the peacekeeper--Negotiation and Mediation, and Investigate and Report Violations.

As we have already stated, peacekeepers must employ non-traditional methods in order to deter violence. Very rarely will they have the luxury of using or even threatening the use of combat power as their primary means to deter violence.<sup>52</sup> This is true for primarily two reasons. First, the rules of engagement (ROE) will normally prohibit such action. The political agreements made by the belligerents underwrite the peacekeepers presence and will determine the ROE before the peacekeeping mission is initiated. While the ROE will normally limit the use of active force to self-defense, the particular agreements in the mandate will determine the use of active force. Second, peacekeeping forces are usually small in number and only lightly armed. Again, political arrangements will determine the size and composition of the peacekeeping force. Thus, the personal qualities of the peacekeepers are often the tools used to deter violence through negotiation and mediation.<sup>53</sup>

Tact, diplomacy, and quiet reasoning when negotiating or mediating between the contestants; complete self restraint, infinite patience, and tireless effort regardless of provocation are the weapons of the peacekeeper's trade--not his self-loading rifle--and through the judicious use of them he can defuse potentially dangerous situations, reduce tensions that could lead to violence, and thereby control and

contain the conflict from escalating into something worse.<sup>54</sup>

It is easy to see that the role of a peacekeeper is one that is more closely associated with a referee than a soldier. He must be able to "deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant."<sup>55</sup> Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University, identified two elemental themes underlying the pure type formulation of a peacekeeping force: non-coercion and impartiality.<sup>56</sup> Both non-coercion and impartiality are consistent with the overall goal of peacekeeping missions: to help reduce tension and allow the belligerents to negotiate a permanent peace. However, since their training as soldiers imbues an aggressive attitude focused on direct confrontation and the application of violence through combat power, both non-coercion and impartiality may not be easily adopted by even the most disciplined and well-trained soldiers.<sup>57</sup> After all, soldiers are, in essence, positively oriented towards action.

What this means is that peacekeepers must adopt a different approach or "attitude adjustment" in their new role. Adopting and maintaining the proper attitude is one of the most important aspects of successful peacekeeping and yet it is quite often misunderstood. An attitude adjustment means nothing more than de-emphasizing a soldier's martial orientation; however, inculcating this change is not an overnight process. The soldier is trained for an environment



filled with violence that is directed against an enemy force. Conversely, the peacekeeper is limited in his use of force and operates in an environment where there is no "enemy" force. For example, the XVIII Airborne Corps' SOP in support of the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO) states under Annex F, Rules of Engagement:

- a. The MFO will, to the utmost, seek to fulfill its mission and tasks without resorting to the active use of force.
- b. Active use of force is authorized only as a last resort when other means have failed.
- c. Active use of force is authorized only in self-defense and in resisting forceful attempts to prevent MFO personnel from discharging their duties.<sup>58</sup>

A peacekeeping force required to act in this manner operates under what Morris Janowitz termed the "constabulary concept." In his book, The Professional Soldier, Janowitz describes this concept as

[providing] a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.<sup>59</sup>

Further analysis was provided by Dr. Moskos who said that forces operating under the constabulary model would recognize the use or threat of force as being carefully adjusted to the political objective pursued.<sup>60</sup> If used arbitrarily, the use or threat of force can often create situations counter to the overall goal of the peacekeeping

mission. Thus, Moskos described a peacekeeping force as "military components from various nations operating under the command of an impartial world body, committed to the absolute minimum use of force, which seeks to reduce or prevent armed hostilities"<sup>61</sup>

This section has presented a brief review of what this author believes are the essential personal qualities of soldiers who make up a peacekeeping force. These are the qualities of impartiality and non-coercion. As previously stated, these are not qualities that can be acquired overnight. Indeed, they are diametrically opposed to the martial orientation in which we so ardently attempt to inculcate our soldiers. Thus, we cannot expect a one-time STX or FTX to reorient a soldier's attitude toward the use of force. This is obviously a training process that requires sufficient time--perhaps 6 to 8 weeks--in order to achieve the desired results. Adopting a different approach or "attitude adjustment" through a combination of classroom and situational training exercises can help soldiers in assuming their roles as peacekeepers.

#### IV Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to apply the Battle Focused Training concept to a theoretical peacekeeping mission and task list in order to identify peacekeeping training requirements for a light infantry force. Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.

First, Battle Focused Training can prepare a light infantry organization for the majority of military-type tasks necessary to execute a peacekeeping force operation without detracting significantly from their warfighting focus. In this theoretical study, 70% of the supporting collective tasks to our peacekeeping METL are warfighting collective tasks (see Table 6 in Appendix A). The other 30% are peacekeeping specific tasks (identified later in this chapter). Proficiency on these identified tasks will of course depend upon the frequency of training and this will be based on the conditions of METT-T established in training scenarios.

This 70% comprises 22--of the 48--warfighting collective tasks (see Table 6 in Appendix A) and these tasks have either a high or moderate likelihood of use in a peacekeeping environment. This is not to say that all are peacekeeping-specific collective tasks, but that these collective tasks both support our peacekeeping METL and have a good chance (high and moderate) of being executed in a peacekeeping mission. This means that nearly 50% of all warfighting collective tasks at the platoon and squad level are likely to be employed in a peacekeeping operation.

While the percentage of supporting collective tasks in general appeared good, our "high-pay-off" list did not fair as well. Remembering the high pay-off definition: a warfighting task which is directly transferable to a peacekeeping task and has a high probability of employment in a peacekeeping

operation. There are only seven of the 48 tasks (and only two of the seven Battlefield Operating Systems--intelligence, mobility and survivability <sup>62</sup>) which fit this categorization. Table 5 below indicates them.

Table 5  
High-Payoff Collective Tasks

Reconnoiter Zone	Reconnoiter Area
Reconnoiter Route	Construct Obstacles
Breach Obstacles	Occupy OP and Perform Surveillance
Maintain OPSEC.	

Unfortunately, these tasks appear in few of the wartime operations (see Table 7 in Appendix A for all 22 warfighting collective tasks and their relationship to the seven wartime operations and our peacekeeping METL). Three of the tasks-- Reconnoiter Zone and Route, and Occupy OP and Perform Surveillance--support only one wartime operation-- Reconnaissance/Security. Reconnoiter Area appears in four wartime operations--Attack, Raid, Ambush, and Reconnaissance/Security. Construct Obstacles supports two operations--Defend and Retrograde, while Breach Obstacles supports three--Movement to Contact, Attack, and Raid. Maintain OPSEC supports six of the seven wartime operations. Thus, nearly 50% of our high-payoff tasks are found in the Recon/Security mission.

Reconnaissance and surveillance are important tasks in a peacekeeping operation. With the infrequency these tasks are likely to be trained given a lesser association with wartime missions than other collective tasks, additional training time should be devoted to these tasks. The same applies to obstacle building and breaching. While obstacle breaching is likely to receive relatively more training time, peacekeepers will also have to construct obstacles as part of roadblocks and checkpoints leading into buffer zones. The key for trainers is to integrate these high-payoff tasks into STXs and FTXs, not to isolate these tasks from the unit's Battle Focused Training.

Second, while Battle Focused Training makes up 70% of the supporting collective tasks to our peacekeeping METL, there are additional training requirements prior to deploying a peacekeeping force. These are peacekeeping specific collective tasks which are necessary for a peacekeeping force. While some portions of the task may be found in a warfighting task, they do not match-up entirely. Therefore, these tasks require specific training apart from Battle Focused Training; however, with a little ingenuity, some of these tasks can be integrated into Battle Focused Training. For example, an infantry squad, acting in an opposing forces (OPFOR) role, could, as part of the scenario, be required to create and man a peacekeeping checkpoint or roadblock.

The additional peacekeeping specific tasks are:

A. Establish and Conduct checkpoints, Roadblocks, and Searches. Checkpoints and roadblocks--closed checkpoints--will vary in positioning and structure based on the terms of reference. Their primary purpose is to demonstrate a peacekeeping force presence, survey and report activities, check and inspect personnel and traffic, prevent infiltration, act as an OP, block all or selected traffic.<sup>63</sup> This task requires peacekeepers to apply both military skills as well as the personal qualities of tact, diplomacy, and self-discipline. Checkpoint personnel should focus skills on isolating problems quickly, preventing escalation and solving problems on the spot.

B. Provide Traffic Control. Traffic control provides for an orderly movement of vehicles and personnel through checkpoints leading into buffer zones. Traffic control also maintains control of movement inside the buffer zone. Peacekeepers can use traffic control procedures to monitor and prevent attempts to smuggle arms, explosives, or ammunition. However, like manning checkpoints, traffic control demands both military and personal skills.

C. Create and Maintain a Buffer Zone. Creating and maintaining a buffer zone is essential to separating belligerent parties. It provides a neutral space between them. It also includes a great number of both military and

non-military tasks such as obstacle clearing and construction, patrolling, surveillance, negotiations and mediations.

D. Disperse Prohibited Demonstrations. Although host nation police forces are normally required to control demonstrations, peacekeeping forces are often called upon to control and disperse them. This task is very often one of the most difficult to conduct since any excessive use of force could create a situation in which the peacekeeping force becomes part of the local problem. The task requires peacekeepers to exercise absolute discipline and control in order to prevent escalating tensions.

E. Investigation of Complaints. If belligerents do not feel as though their allegations of violations are being investigated fairly and impartially, tensions could increase or fighting may even resume. The most important skills the peacekeeper can apply to this task are listening, understanding the facts, remaining objective, and maintaining impartiality. Here again, the peacekeeper must display a professional attitude that seeks to gain facts and either report the facts to a higher authority or make sound decisions based on those facts.

Finally, there are additional training requirements related to personal skills. Achieving the right level of personal skills and qualities is the most difficult of all peacekeeping related skills. This training must occur prior to the peacekeeping operation and must emphasize the personal

qualities of self-discipline, tact, diplomacy, reasoning, infinite patience, restrain, and caution. It is important to remember that the ultimate goal of the peacekeeper is to deter violence. He does this not through the use of active force, but primarily through his attitude which, if employed properly, "defuse[s] potentially dangerous situations, reduce[s] tensions that could lead to violence, and thereby control[s] and contain[s] the conflict from escalating into something worse."<sup>64</sup>

This study has presented a theoretical analysis of peacekeeping. It shows, in theory, that the Army's Battle Focused Training concept provides a majority of the collective skills needed to properly execute a peacekeeping mission. Training is the cornerstone of combat readiness. It is also the cornerstone which prepares soldiers for operations other than war such as peacekeeping. As an anonymous UN peacekeeper once said, "peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."<sup>65</sup> This is a true statement because of the challenging and diverse training programs which prepare soldiers for peacekeeping. Training for war through Battle Focused training prepares U.S. units for many of the tasks associated with peacekeeping.



Appendix A. TABLES 6 & 7

Table 6  
Warfighting Collective Tasks  
Likely to Support Peacekeeping METL

Task	Battlefield Operating System	Likelihood of Use
Reconnoiter Zone	Intelligence	high
Reconnoiter Area	Intelligence	high
Reconnoiter Route	Intelligence	high
Occupy OP Perform Surveillance	Intelligence	high
Breach Obstacles	Mobility and Survivability	high
Perform Helicopter Movement	Mobility and Survivability	high
Prepare for Chemical Attack	Mobility and Survivability	moderate
Cross Chemically Contaminated Area	Mobility and Survivability	moderate
Construct Obstacles	Mobility and Survivability	high
Maintain Operations Security	Mobility and Survivability	high
Perform Aerial Resupply	Combat Service Support	high
Perform Vehicle Operations	Combat Service Support	high
Sustain	Combat Service Support	high
Occupy Assembly Area	Maneuver	moderate
Move Tactically	Maneuver	high
Cross Danger Area	Maneuver	high
Perform Tactical Roadmarch	Maneuver	high
Perform Passage of Lines	Maneuver	moderate
Occupy a Patrol Base	Maneuver	high

Task	Battlefield Operating System	Likelihood of Use
Perform Linkup	Maneuver	high
Disengage	Maneuver	moderate
Consolidate and Reorganize	C2	moderate

Table 7 indicates the task relationship between wartime operations and peacekeeping METL (wartime operations are numbered accordingly: 1 MTC, 2 Attack, 3 Raid, 4 Ambush, 5 Recon/Security, 6 Defend, 7 Retrograde; peacekeeping METL are numbered: 1 Separate the Belligerents, 2 Maintain Surveillance and Supervision, 3 Maintain Law and Order, 4 Investigate and Report Violations, 5 Conduct Negotiation and Mediation).

Table 7  
Warfighting Collective Tasks  
which Support Peacekeeping METL and Their  
Relationship to Wartime Operations

Task	Battlefield Operating System	Wartime Operations #	Peacekeeping METL #
Reconnoiter Zone	Intelligence	5	1,2,4
Reconnoiter Area	Intelligence	2,3,4,5	1,2,4
Reconnoiter Route	Intelligence	5	1,2,4
Occupy OP Perform Surveillance	Intelligence	5	1,2,3,4
Breach Obstacles	Mobility and Survivability	1,2,3	1,3
Perform Helicopter Movement	Mobility and Survivability	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	2
Prepare for Chemical Attack	Mobility and Survivability	1,2,3,4,6,7	1,3

<b>Task</b>	<b>Battlefield Operating System</b>	<b>Wartime Operations #</b>	<b>Peacekeeping NETL #</b>
Cross Chemically Contaminated Area	Mobility and Survivability	1,2,3,4,6	1
Construct Obstacles	Mobility and Survivability	6,7	1,3
Maintain Operations Security	Mobility and Survivability	1,2,3,4,6,7	1,2,3,4,5
Perform Aerial Resupply	Combat Service Support	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	1,2
Perform Vehicle Operations	Combat Service Support	1,2,4,5,6,7	1,3
Sustain	Combat Service Support	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	1,2,3
Occupy Assembly Area	Maneuver	1,2,3,4,6,7	
Move, Tactically	Maneuver	1,2,3,4,6,7	1,3
Cross Danger Area	Maneuver	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	1,3
Perform Tactical Roadmarch	Maneuver	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	3
Perform Passage of Lines	Maneuver	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	1,3
Occupy a Patrol Base	Maneuver	1,3,4,5,7	2,3
Perform Linkup	Maneuver	1,2,3,4,5,6	2,3
Disengage	Maneuver	1,3,4,6,7	3
Consolidate and Reorganize	C2	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	1,3

## ENDNOTES

1. Carl Von Clausewitz discussed the need for obtaining a decision through directing the utmost concentration of one's combat power against the enemy's center of gravity in On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 489. Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, the French military theorist whose theory was founded on the use of interior lines of operations and concentration, wrote in The Art of War, (California: Presido Press, 1992) that tactics involved using one's forces at the decisive moment and at the decisive point on the field of battle. In the U.S. Army's keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations--Operations, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993) 2-9, notes that commanders must seek to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm are good examples of applying overwhelming combat power at the right time and place.
2. FM 100-5, 13-0. The 1993 version of this manual now includes a chapter devoted to "Operations Other Than War."
3. Ibid., 2-0.
4. Ibid.
5. Alex Morrison, "The World of the Future," Peacekeeping and International Relations, vol. 22, no. 3, (May/June 1993), 1-3.
6. FM 100-5, 2-22, recognizes five types of infantry: Light, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger, and Mechanized infantry. This study excludes Ranger and Mechanized infantry.
7. Although the basic force structure will be situational dependent, Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, (Revised Final Draft) (Washington, DC, 10 August 1992) IV-7, states that with some augmentation, infantry forces are organized, equipped, trained, and suited for peacekeeping operations. J. D. Murray, in "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping: Problems and Recommendations," Peacekeeping Appraisals & Proposals, wrote that due to the flexibility and international availability, the main operational unit in all peacekeeping forces has been the basic infantry battalion. In The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 2ed, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), 8, it discusses peacekeeping forces as

consisting of "lightly armed infantry units." U.S. Army, FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1992) 4-22, states that a review of the force structure of all UN PKOs shows mostly infantry type units, augmented by support personnel. This is also supported by U.S. peacekeeping operations in the Sinai. The force structure has been light infantry, air assault infantry, and airborne infantry units. The mission in Somalia includes light infantry forces as well.

8. U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Field Service Regulations--Train the Force, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), i.

9. This issue is also raised by the authors, Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) 273.

10. Ibid., 11.

11. Current Joint doctrine identifies different types of peacekeeping missions. Joint Pub (Test) 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, September 1990 and Joint Pub (Revised Final Draft) 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Peacekeeping Operations, August 1992, recognize three broad missions for US peacekeeping forces: peacekeeping support, observer missions, and peacekeeping forces. This study's focus is on peacekeeping forces.

12. FM 100-5, 2-2, discusses the Total Force concept whereby the Army must meet future missions with a small force.

13. This mission statement is not intended to be the definitive statement for future peacekeeping operations. It is developed in this study as part of the METL development process.

14. Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, (Revised Final Draft) (Washington, DC, 10 August 1992), GL-11.

15. FM 7-98, 4-1, uses the phrase "to prevent a recurrence of fighting." In FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington: Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, 1990), 4-4, it uses the phrase "detering violent acts by the disputants." FM 100-5, 13-7,

states: "the peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its physical presence...."

16. Joint Publication 3-07.3, GL-12.

17. Ibid., A-3.

18. Ibid., GL-11.

19. XVIII Airborne Corps, Standard Operating Procedure in Support of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), (Fort Bragg, N.C., n.d.), F-2.

20. Ibid.

21. U.S. Army, ARTEP 7-8-MTP, Rifle Platoon and Squad, (Washington: Department of the Army, September 1988), 1-4.

22. Some of these tasks are both a warfighting and peacekeeping collective task. For example, Occupy OP and Perform Surveillance is both. Additionally, there are some warfighting collective tasks which are not peacekeeping tasks per se, but can support a peacekeeping mission. For example, Perform Helicopter Movement is a warfighting collective task which is likely to be employed by peacekeepers.

23. FM 25-100, 2-1, discusses the METL development process. Identification of a unit's wartime mission is essential to developing a METL.

24. Ibid.

25. This mission statement is not intended to be the definitive statement for future peacekeeping operations. It is developed in this study as part of the METL development process.

26. Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Test Pub) (Washington, DC, September 1990) IV-9 - IV-13; Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-4.

27. Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-5.

28. Mala Tabory, The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai: Organization, Structure, and Function, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 78.

29. Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-5 - I-7.

30. Ibid., I-8; and see note # 7.
31. Ibid., I-1 - I-2.
32. Websters Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, 2ed. (New York: New World Dictionary, 1979), 1317.
33. The issue here is not fighting between nation-states. Since the belligerents have consented to the peacekeeping effort we can assume that hostilities between their nations have ended. Our concern is the incidental fighting by various factions within the different governments that may still exist, if even sporadically.
34. Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-1 - I-2.
35. Joint Pub 3-07.3, VI-3, identifies impartiality as one of the personal qualities of a peacekeeper. U.S. Army, FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict, 4-25, notes that personnel predeployment training should try to impart impartiality.
36. The issue concerning the use of force by peacekeeping forces is a dynamic one. Joint Pub 3-07.3, II-17, states: The use of force is justified only in self-defense when members of the peacekeeping operation are threatened with death or serious bodily harm." However, Durch, in The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, states that what constitutes self-defense will vary by mission. FM 100-20 states that the ROE will *normally* allow the use of force only in self-defense. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Training, UN Peacekeeping Training: Training Guidelines and Exercises, (Turin: International Training Center, n.d.) 4-3, identifies four conditions under which force may be used:
- A. Self-defence.
  - B. Defence of PKO premises and vehicles under attack.
  - C. When PKO is prevented forcefully from carrying out its duties.
  - D. Support of PKO troops under attack.
37. William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993), 224.
38. Ibid., 187.
39. The information in this table has come from the following sources: UN Peacekeeping Training: Training Guidelines and

Exercises, 20; FM 7-98, 4-10; FM 100-20, 4-9; Joint Pub 3-07, IV-13; and Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-8.

40. Joint Pub 3-07.3, VI-1, states that they are likely to be "independent actions." This Joint Pub also contains a section on Small Unit Considerations, IV-18 - IV-20, and states that "the individual's actions may be the most significant factor in the overall success of the peacekeeping mission." The tasks mentioned: manning observation posts, conducting security patrols, establishing and manning roadblocks and checkpoints are typically squad and platoon tasks.

41. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Training, UN Peacekeeping Training: Training Guidelines and Exercises, (Turin: International Training Center, n.d.), 20.

42. Ibid., 20.

43. Ibid., 5-10

44. Sources: FM 7-98, 4-10; FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 4-5; FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, (Washington: Department of the Army December 1990) A-1; Joint Pub 3-07.3, VI-6 - VI 10; and the UN's Peacekeeping Operations Training Guide, 27-62..

45. Durch, 214. Peacekeepers were manning observation posts and patrolling the Saudi/Yemen boarder approximately 650 kms over very rugged terrain. Despite aerial and ground patrolling, UNYOM's forces were unable to adequately provide surveillance along the border.

46. ARTEP 7-8 MTP, 1-4.

47. ARTEP 7-8 MTP, 2-4 - 2-7.

48. Ibid.

49. It would seem unlikely for peacekeepers to have to worry about this in light of the consent of belligerents; however, during UNYOM operations there were allegations of the Egyptians using poison gas. Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 116.

50. FM 7-98, 4-14.

51. Ibid., 4-17.



52. FM 100-5, 13-7, states that peacekeeping forces deter violent acts by their physical presence.

53. Rikhye, et al, in The Thin Blue Line, 11, discusses the characterization of peacekeeping by stating "the role of international peacekeeping lies in the fact that enforcement plays no part in it. It is the concept of peaceful action, not persuasion by force, where the fundamental principles are those of objectivity and nonalignment with the parties to the dispute.... The weapons of the peacekeeper in achieving his objectives are those of negotiation, mediation, quiet diplomacy and reasoning, tact and the patience of JOB...."

54. Ibid., 267-268.

55. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 4-1.

56. Charles C. Moskos, "UN Peacekeepers," Armed Forces and Society 1 (1975), 388.

57. Rikhye, et al, in The Thin Blue Line, 267-279, states that a highly professional military force is an invaluable asset to a peacekeeping force through its well-tried and effecient operational and military procedures. However, "plain military expertise, though a considerable asset, is not of itself the only prerequisite for peacekeeping. . . ." He goes on to state "that even the best trained and most competent soldiers need training in peacekeeping skills."

58. XVIII Airborne Corps, Standard Operating Procedure: F-1-1.

59. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, (New York: Free Press, 1960), 418.

60. Moskos, 389, Moskos wrote that in a peacekeeping situation this could mean "something approaching non coercion."

61. Ibid.

62. The seven Combat Functions (at the tactical level they are known as Battlefield Operating Systems) as listed in FM 100-5, 2-12, are: Intelligence, Maneuver, Fire Support, Air Defense, Mobility and Survivability, Logistics, and Battle Command.

63. UN Peacekeeping Training Guide, 8-3.

64. Rikhye, et al, The Thin Blue Line, 267-268.

65. Quoted in FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 4-1.

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